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ARMS TRADE OFFSETS AND CASES OF CORRUPTION: THE 
USAGE OF ANTI-CORRUPTION TOOLS IN SPECIAL FORMS OF 
ARMS ACQUISITIONS 
Peter Platzgummer 
ABSTRACT 
Because of a lack of transparency and the high complexity of administrative processes, 
arms acquisition is an area with a high risk of corruption. The aim of this paper is: 1) to 
provide a typology of cases of corruption in compensatory trade agreements, so called 
arms trade offsets, that have become integral parts of most arms trades; and 2) to ana-
lyze tools possessed by government agencies concerned to prevent or detect corruption. 
Based on an analysis of all major English-speaking newspaper articles between 1980 
and mid-2012, the results show that only a few different types of corruption typically 
exist in arms trade offsets. Also, the lack of transparency leads to an unusually high 
amount of questionable allegations. Contrary to most other scholarly articles on cor-
ruption, this paper argues that there may be no need for new and stricter anti-
corruption policies in this area, but that the usage of basic performance management 
and already existing due diligence tools could be helpful. 
Keywords – Corruption in Arms Acquisition and Offsets, Due Diligence, Performance 
Management, Tools to Fight Corruption, Transparency 
INTRODUCTION 
Fighting corruption has become one of the major topics in public management. On one 
hand, a theoretical discussion on drivers of corruption, based on Robert Klitgaard’s re-
nowned book Controlling Corruption (1991) has been going on for almost 20 years. 
And even though these theoretical frameworks have been discussed and widely rear-
ranged (see for example Hors 2001 or McLinden 2005) the main ideas that corruption is 
driven by a lack of efficient control, discretionary power, and the possibility to work 
within a network still remain the same. On the other hand, many researchers have been 
dealing with concrete strategies that states use against corruption, especially the rela-
tively extensive research on the initiation of anti-corruption-agencies (see for example 
DeSousa 2006, Klemencic & Stusek 2007, or Quah 2011). Other aspects, such as the 
necessity for administrative reforms (Fjeldstad 2003), or the question of interrelation-
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ships between a reform such as New Public Management and corruption (von Maravic 
& Reichard 2003), have been discussed broadly. What can be seen is that most research 
and discussions on corruption are held on a national level and end relatively quickly, 
with recommendations to introduce either new national strategies and policies (Bryane 
&Polner 2008), or new audit systems (Baltaci & Yilmaz 2006 or Cantens et al. 2010). 
While an introduction of a specific strategy or the change of the audit system may have 
a positive effect on the fight against corruption, they are both rather medium-term op-
tions for a governmental organization. Instead, this paper focuses on already existing 
tools within governmental agencies which could limit repercussions arising from 
Klitgaards’ drivers. It therefore approaches the following question: 
‘Does a public agency have already existing tools to detect and fight possible cases of 
corruption?’ 
The objective of this paper is to show that a high amount of cases of corruption could be 
uncovered by tools a public manager has at hand. The problem is often not at the strate-
gic- but rather the operational level, where a lack of resources, knowledge or motivation 
ease corrupt practices. This will be exemplified by anecdotal cases of corruption in 
compensatory trade agreements within larger weapon system procurements, so called 
arms trade offsets. This choice has been made for two reasons. First, offsets are “carry-
ing high corruption risks” (Magahy et al. 2010, 2), but only a few cases of corruption 
have been discussed so far. This paper is aimed to prompt further discussion in Public 
Management by addressing the need for concrete data with an extensive international 
overview of corruption cases in offsets. Second, offsets are coordinated by one, relative-
ly small and specialized agency per country which makes cases well comparable and 
delimitable. 
The first part of this paper is a directed qualitative content analysis (Hsieh & Shannon 
2005) of allegations of corruption in major newspaper articles between 1980 and 2012. 
Newspaper articles were coded based upon stakeholders involved and at which stage of 
the offset-process the allegations occurred, and were compared to Heidenheimer & 
Johnston’s typology of corruption (2001). What can be seen is that a relatively small 
number of different types exists and that even this small number can be combined into 
only two major scenarios: a governmental employee is bribed to favor one of the stake-
holders in the process, or the employee is personally linked to a company and is there-
fore favoring it. The second part of this paper discusses usages of three already existing 
anti-corruption tools: concepts of due diligence, performance management, and general 
aspects of transparency. The paper argues that the above mentioned major corruption 
scenarios in arms trade offsets could be identified with already existing management 
tools but that the identification of corruption often lacks the usage of even basic instru-
ments of anti-corruption policies. An additional finding is that the lack of transparency 
in arms trade offsets leads to a relatively high amount of misunderstandings or even 
wrongful allegations, these force agencies to focus on areas less important for anti-
corruption efforts. 
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DEFENSE PROCUREMENT AND OFFSETS 
According to a recent report from the Stockholm International Peace Research Institute, 
40 percent of all corruption in international transactions occurs in the arms trade (SIPRI 
2010, 1), moreover the Trade Promotion Coordinating Committee of the US Depart-
ment of Commerce claimed in a March 2000 report that the defense sector was respon-
sible for more than 50 percent of all bribery allegations between 1994 and 1999 
(Magahy et al. 2010, 14). Key reasons for this concentration in arms trade corruption 
include the high value, and therefore the importance, of single trades for individual 
countries and defense suppliers. Additionally, security-relevant transactions increase in 
complexity because of the high amount of stakeholders involved in the process and the 
secretiveness of the area as such. This makes it harder and harder for public managers to 
control and communicate information to superior authorities and the public. 
When procuring armaments, a country must decide if a weapons system, or a compo-
nent thereof, can be developed domestically or should be purchased off-the-shelf from a 
foreign supplier. Beyond these two options lie other alternatives, such as licensed pro-
duction or shared development projects wherein the development or production of an 
item is shared between the companies of the vendor and supplier countries. On one 
hand, domestic development would theoretically strengthen a country’s defense indus-
trial base and secure jobs and technological know-how, therefore satisfying the specific 
needs of the domestic armed forces. Yet this is "also likely to be the most expensive 
option" (Martin 1996a, 1) for maintaining the country’s military capability. On the other 
hand, off-the-shelf purchasing, though potentially less expensive, means getting a sys-
tem that is developed for another country's armed forces' needs, producing only jobs 
abroad and comporting a danger to the secure supply of required parts and technical 
assistance. However, it is likely to be significantly cheaper. In order to overcome this 
dilemma, many states link their defense purchases to compensatory trade agreements, 
often referred to as ‘arms trade offsets’, ‘countertrade’ or ‘industrial participation’. Off-
sets mean that a country buying off-the-shelf military equipment forces the foreign sup-
plier of the product to reinvest an amount of the product price into the domestic indus-
trial base1. By adopting these practices a country can get a foreign military system with-
out paying initial development costs, and theoretically still generate some domestic in-
dustrial benefits. These offsets are usually defined as some percentage of the purchasing 
contract price, and a time period is set for the fulfillment of them. Additionally, when 
procurement with an offset contract is signed, the foreign company works directly with 
domestic companies to fulfill the offset obligation. A specialized governmental agency 
monitors these processes and also evaluates the performance of these offset deals. As 
these additional processes and the coordination of several new stakeholders lead to far 
more complex transactions than a basic outright purchase, as well as to additional 
(transaction) costs of up to 20 percent of the original system price (Friedli et al. 2009), 
the probability for corruption increases as well. 
Since the 1970s the number of countries using countertrade practices has steadily risen. 
While countertrade originally consisted mainly of barter agreements exchanging goods 
rather than using a currency, to ease transactions with countries of the Soviet Union and 
other countries with ‘weak’ currencies, this is no longer the case. Today, the vast major-
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ity of countertrade transactions include offset agreements to maintain the defense indus-
trial base and increasingly the dual-use and civilian industry. More than 75 countries 
worldwide apply offset policies regularly and several additional countries use offsets for 
some specific procurements (CTO Data Services 2012). Most of these countries possess 
only a single governmental body with usually a small staff of approximately five to 
twenty employees to govern these deals. Thus the functions of these agencies are rela-
tively similar and, most importantly, they share the common problem of controlling the 
different offset deals between foreign vendors and domestic industries, making them an 
interesting case for further research. 
As Figure 1 shows, an offset agency (within a domestic government) has three major 
functions. 
Figure 1: The relation between the main stakeholders in arms trade offsets  
 
Source: Own research. 
First, it defines the offset contract with the foreign supplier. As offsets are based on the 
procurement of a large weapon system, the contract is discussed parallel to the pro-
curement contract. It usually defines the overall amount of offsets and the division be-
tween direct offsets, where domestic companies are producing parts of the actual system 
ordered, and indirect offsets, all transactions between the foreign vendor and the domes-
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tic beneficiaries that are not directly linked to the weapon system. The offset contract is 
often considered in the overall tender process. For example, in Switzerland offsets are 
incorporated in the cost/benefit analysis and account for 8 per cent of the result (EFK 
2007, 17). The reason for the consideration of offsets within the selection of the weapon 
system is that the offset agreements can influence the technical specifications of the 
good procured. This is especially the case when a country wants to use offsets not just 
for economic reasons but also to maintain or even develop own defense technological 
capabilities2 and therefore demands for changes of the existing system produced by do-
mestic companies considered important for national security. Second, the agency is re-
sponsible for monitoring the implementation of the offset agreement. The foreign sup-
plier has to hand in proofs for the quality and quantity of transactions with the domestic 
industrial base. The agency is verifying these proofs with the vendor but also autono-
mously with the large group of beneficiaries. For example, the 1.1 billion dollar pro-
curement of combat vehicles in Switzerland led to more than 1000 offset transactions 
between the foreign supplier and more than 250 Swiss companies within 10 years 
(Platzgummer & Gonzales Lozano 2013). Third, the foreign supplier often lacks the 
specific insights needed to find the best partners in the contracted country. Therefore, 
the offset agency is not just controlling but also informing companies from the domestic 
defense industrial base about possible cooperation with the foreign vendor. Also, in 
some countries, agencies can suggest or request that specific companies produce parts 
of a weapon system. This is especially done, when the company is considered relevant 
for maintaining the defense industrial capability of a country. 
What has become evident is that even though offsets are a rather exceptional activity for 
a government, the functions of an offset agency are relatively similar to other govern-
mental agencies. For example industrial promotion activities or R&D projects require 
comparable control- or monitoring functions. 
While the overall economic effects of offsets have been extensively addressed in aca-
demic literature (Brauer 2004, 54), corruption and the role of public agencies, and there-
fore aspects of Public Management, have not been subject to closer examination. This is 
particularly unfortunate given the sheer volume of trades and money controlled by these 
governmental offset agencies. In 2006 the overall volume of offsets in participating 
member states of the European Defence Agency was estimated at 5.6 billion euros, 
which would correspond to 200-400 million euros per annum for each member country 
(Eriksson et al. 2007, 4). Even a small and neutral country such as Switzerland, with no 
membership to the EDA or NATO, finds itself within these same average volumes of 
about 300 million euros per annum (Friedli et al. 2009). Although the data is unavaila-
ble for countries outside of Europe, the volume for other continents is likely in a similar 
if not even higher range, considering the fact that some countries tend to have offset 
obligations far beyond 100 percent, and are not facing the same defense procurement 
budget cuts as European countries have in recent years (Marshall 2012). What makes 
offset deals even more prone to corruption is the impossibility to compare costs between 
countries. First, this is because of the different military requirements within the same 
weapons system, and second, because of additional coordination expenses between the 
foreign vendor and domestic companies. 
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Unfortunately, quantitative data on corruption in offsets is lacking, and only a handful 
of examples are used in (academic) discussions thus far3. The reason is that, aside from 
speculations about the potential corruption risk claimed by most authors, only a few 
cases of corruption have been discussed in public. 
TYPES OF CORRUPTION IN OFFSETS 
Usually, offsets are seen as a part of defense procurement and are seldom of higher in-
terest to the general public. This also holds true for discussions of corruption in offsets. 
While corruption in arms trade in general has always been of high interest for research-
ers and specialized media, broader discussions of corruption in offsets are a relatively 
recent phenomenon. In 1999 the corruption within a South African defense acquisition 
came to public attention because of the sheer number of allegations and high volume of 
the procurement and offsets (Crawford-Browne 2009). Bringing further general aware-
ness, Transparency International, an NGO specifically fighting against corruption, pub-
lished a noteworthy report and started a campaign against corruption in offsets in 2010 
(Magahy et al. 2010). 
One of the major problems when studying corruption in offsets is the fact that it is diffi-
cult to narrow down any research to specific types of corruption because “definitions 
are controversial, and solid evidence is often elusive” (Johnston 1991, 9). To have the 
maximum number of possibilities for further analysis, this paper used the relatively 
broad definition provided by Transparency International: “[corruption is] the abuse of 
entrusted power for private gain”(Magahy et al. 2010) This definition is even broader 
than the definition of the United Nations Development Programme, which defines cor-
ruption as “the misuse of public power, office or authority for private benefit– through 
bribery, extortion, influence peddling, nepotism, fraud, speed money or embezzlement” 
(UNDP 1999, 7). 
To give an overview of types of corruption in offsets, a directed qualitative content 
analysis of newspaper and specialized magazine articles was conducted. The selection 
was based on a LexisNexis major world publication search, which is also the reason for 
the limitation to articles written in or translated into the English language. Even though 
it is possible that some of the corruption allegations have not been discussed in non-
English written media, it is likely that all major cases of corruption in the area of arma-
ment and defense have at least been mentioned in the prominent publications available 
via LexisNexis, such as Jane’s Defence Weekly, Defense News or Aviation Week which 
have the resources to report on all major foreign defense news items. In an initial collec-
tion set, all articles published between 1980 and June 2012 containing the words “de-
fense”, “offsets” and “corruption” or important synonyms4 in the full text were selected. 
The 990 resulting articles were filtered by hand to ensure that the remaining articles 
explicitly dealt with corruption in arms trade offsets. The final sample contained 250 
articles from 12 countries5. The sample was supplemented by academic papers and re-
ports from the same timeframe that specifically discussed questions regarding corrup-
tion in offsets6. 
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More than half of the articles (153) dealt with the aforementioned South African case, a 
case also included in all academic papers used for the data collection. The reason for 
this may be the uniqueness of the procurement as such (it involved an exceptionally 
high amount of offsets and a number of different allegations7) but there is a high proba-
bility that it is also due to the fact that South Africa, as an English-speaking country, 
would be more frequently discussed in English-language print media. Similarly, India 
(30), Saudi Arabia (15) and Australia (12) were highly represented in the data, while all 
allegations in other countries were mentioned between one to eight times in the articles. 
One set of 20 articles consisted of texts where offsets were associated with corruption 
but no example was given, therefore these articles were not used for the categorization 
scheme, but will be referred to in the overall discussion in the second part of this paper8. 
It is important to mention that the number of articles pertaining to a country did not of-
fer valuable clues on the specific number of offset deals, as a majority of the articles 
summarize several offset deals within a country throughout the article. A quantitative 
analysis of cases of allegations was insofar not possible. But, it seems that most corrup-
tion in a country happened within the same procurement. This could be explained by the 
fact that corruption implies a certain legal and economic risk for a company and that a 
company which has already crossed this threshold is more likely to repeat a so far suc-
cessful practice9. 
Instead of a quantitative analysis the focus therefore shifted to a qualitative definition of 
different types of corruption in offsets based on the allegations in the newspaper arti-
cles. While several very general categorizations of corruption exist (e.g. Heidenheimer 
& Johnston 2001), a specific typology for corruption with offsets has not yet been de-
veloped. For a further discussion of specific tools a governmental agency has to detect 
and fight corruption, it seems inevitable to specifically define what types of corruption 
the agency has to face. Even though the first report on offsets of Transparency Interna-
tional had several quasi categorizations for portions of offset processes, for example 
pathways from tender to winning the award (Magahy et al. 2010, 18), they were not 
sufficient to encompass the range of corruption cases examined. 
A qualitative content analysis was used to utilize a broader but more exhaustive method 
of categorization. Common typologies for corruption need data about the interests of the 
corrupt actors, which cannot be derived solely from the data set used. Therefore the ini-
tial coding of the 250 relevant articles was only based on most obvious stakeholders and 
the sequences within the offset process. A directed content analysis was used to be able 
to adapt the coding to new findings10. This led to an extension of the number of stake-
holders during the coding. 
First, the allegations were split up according to the main stakeholders involved. As men-
tioned earlier, the increasing number of stakeholders is one of the reasons for a decreas-
ing level of transparency. The next division extends beyond the two most obvious 
groups - those of foreign suppliers and the national importing government - to include 
national beneficiaries (the domestic defense industrial base but also research institu-
tions) that play a major role in the offset business as they are the recipients of the offset 
obligations, as well as third-party entities such as brokers or consultants (Magahy et al. 
2010, 13). It could be reasonable for future in-depth studies to further break down the 
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categories of government and the national beneficiaries into subcategories. So far, the 
category of government includes the offset agency, as well as the decision-makers (gen-
erally politicians, or higher-ranking officials on a ministerial level). National beneficiar-
ies could at least be divided into state-owned and private companies, as there is a high 
chance that state-owned companies are favored over privatized ones, as the case of India 
shows (Raghuvanshi 2005). The separation of defense companies from dual-use and 
civilian companies could also be of further interest, as depending on legal interpretation 
by different governments, the WTO/GATT offset contracts only allow for security-
related deals which are sometimes thereby restricted to defense companies. Alternative-
ly, the legal interpretation could stretch to purely civilian beneficiaries11. The reason for 
this different interpretation lies in the exception of defense procurement in free trade 
agreements due to its effects on the security of a country (Young 2007, 315-318). The 
majority of countries include offsets (as part of the defense procurement) to this excep-
tion. But, countries with a relatively weak defense industrial base tend to allow civilian 
offsets, while countries with a stronger defense industry exclude civilian or even dual-
use products to make sure that important domestic defense companies can benefit ac-
cordingly. 
Second, the allegations were divided according to the course of action within the offset 
process. This level of analysis has already been used in an earlier study (Magahy et al. 
2010, 15–17), but the process after the signing of the contract has been ignored so far by 
scholars. It is true that one major scenario for corruption within the arms trade as a 
whole is as good as done at this point, mainly the means by which one foreign company 
wins the procurement over its competitors. However, other possible scenarios, such as 
national companies attempting to become beneficiaries, still remain as opportunities for 
corruption. As the offset contract as such still seems to be the major turning point within 
the process, the categorization has only been divided into pre- and post- contract agree-
ment phases. 
Relatively similar allegations have been combined here in order to provide a good over-
view of the different types of corruption within offsets. Additionally, the geographical 
locations of these cases of corruption are listed. The articles were not analyzed statisti-
cally due to the fact that multiple examples of the same case have no impact on the se-
verity or the type of the corruption and that a clear differentiation of different cases was 
often not possible based on the newspaper articles. To give an overview of existing cas-
es (and to broaden up the academic discussion to more than the so far used examples), 
anecdotal evidence is used in further discussions. Also, the long period of investigation 
between 1980 and 2012 would imply a time-series analysis. This has not been done be-
cause of two reasons. First, an increase of allegations could be found but this increase is 
allegeable with the overall increase of the use of offset practices, especially after the end 
of the Cold War and in Arab countries in the beginning of the 21st century. Second, off-
sets will only occur when a country has to import a weapon system. Therefore, especial-
ly larger high-tech weapon system procurements include offset agreements. With an 
average lifespan of about 30 years for most of these systems, and very different domes-
tic industrial partners for the different systems (e.g. land systems, combat jets, etc.) 
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there were not enough cases that highlight specific trends over time. Also, the types of 
corruption were distributed relatively evenly over time. 
Table 1: Overview of cases of corruption 
 
Source: Own research. 
What can be seen in Table 1 is that the number of countries with allegations is relatively 
small and that only seven different types of corruption could be identified based on the 
data collected. All pre-contract-agreement cases represented instances of corruption 
where one of the stakeholders tried to influence the competition between potential sup-
pliers to its own benefit, or in other words, where the government favored a specific 
stakeholder who provided more incentives, usually in the form of bribes. All these cases 
can be defined as public-interest-centered types of corruption according to Arnold Hei-
denheimer (Heidenheimer & Johnston 2001, 9). In these cases, the tender process was 
manipulated in a variety of ways. For example, one of the South African procurement 
decisions was based on a shortlist that excluded the price of the arms purchase and 
therefore favored the proposal with the best offset offer (Pressly 2011). Another exam-
ple was the bypassing of the Minister of Defense by the Chief of the Air Force in Indo-
nesia (Roundup: Trade deal 2003) or the temporary loss of all offset proposals by an 
Indian official (Antony warns defence 2011). This latter case, though no evidence could 
be found for corruption, can still be seen as an example of how a tender process could 
be potentially manipulated. Cases where politicians or high-ranking officials were 
bribed to influence decision-makers have been cited in South Africa (AFP 1999), in 
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Italy (Pubby 2012), and in Portugal. The Portuguese case refers to an allegation in 
which an intermediary received 30 million euros for brokering the procurement and the 
offset contract, using portions of the deal to bribe others, including officials of the offset 
agency (Magahy et al. 2010). By far the most media attention was received by a case in 
South Africa because of the proposed (and never completely realized) creation of 
65,000 new jobs (Crawford-Browne 2009). Several companies also tried to ensure busi-
ness with the offset supplier by becoming compulsory partners for the foreign supplier. 
This has happened for example in Australia ('Richo' cleared 1995) and in the Czech 
Republic (Kominek 1998). 
Other allegations of corruption can be seen in the second phase of the offset process 
after the selection of the supplier and the signing of the contract. Multiple cases exist 
especially where a company benefits from being personally associated to the high-
ranking officials or politicians who organized the offsets. For example, this was the case 
in South Africa where a minister took up a position in an offset benefiting company 
directly following his political term (Mitchell), or where politicians were shareholders 
of such companies (February & Calland 2011). These cases can be defined as market-
centered corruption (Heidenheimer & Johnston 2001, 8). The last two types are those 
mentioned most often in the media, but they remain the least explained cases: offset 
deals being used as bribes, and incorrect claiming of offset deals. Unfortunately, there is 
only one article that gives an explanation on how the use of offset deals as bribery could 
have happened: In Korea a deal was claimed as an offset but the service in return by the 
national company never occurred, and thus clearly equates to a bribe situation (Summer 
1998). This type of case could be defined as public-office-centered corruption even 
though the payments seem to be to private companies rather than to public officials 
(Heidenheimer & Johnston 2001, 8). The last type includes cases where the foreign 
supplier tried to claim several offset deals incorrectly, usually by overestimating the 
value of the deal. Allegations about such cases have been made in Australia (Richardson 
1995) and in Portugal (Pop 2010). 
It is important to mention at this point that all of the types discussed here are primarily 
allegations of corruption. All of the articles have been concerned with allegations that 
led to criminal proceedings, but only a few of these cases resulted in the conviction of a 
specific person. Additionally, even though the categories proposed represent, in some 
cases, a risk of corruption, a relatively large portion of the examples from the newspaper 
articles do not. In several cases the fact that the proposed offset benefits were extraordi-
narily high was a reason for corruption allegations. For example, a U.S. company of-
fered new jobs worth three billion U.S. dollars to the Polish government. This lead to 
political statements such as: “Critics call it what it is: bribes and corruption” (Jackson 
2003). The problem with this allegation is that arms trade offsets are often in a legal 
gray area. As already discussed, the WTO/GATT allows offset for security related deals. 
It is argued that arms trades do not always follow clear measures of free trade and com-
petition as the decision is most often based on other criteria, strategic partnerships with 
other nations for example. The same is true for arms trade offsets, where additional 
costs of up to 20 percent of the original price of a system are justified by the possibility 
of maintaining a nation’s own defense industrial base and defense technology transfers. 
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The question is whether a focus on additional employment is within the boundaries of 
these exceptions. A report by the order of the European Defence Agency came to the 
conclusion that 26 percent of all offset deals were awarded to civilian industries (Eriks-
son et al. 2007, 20) and were therefore not defense related. While this was legal at that 
time in the participating member countries of the European Defence Agency12, one 
could argue that the decision for arms trade offsets were not based on issues of defense 
but were efforts by public officials “without regard for the public interest in order to 
achieve a specific kind of private gain – re-election to public office” (Yingling 2013, 
263). While this could therefore be defined as unconventional corruption (in contrast to 
conventional corruption where illegality is a necessary condition)13, it is also true that 
additional employment is an ancillary effect of most trade interactions and - though 
used to promote a public support for arms trade - is not per se the main reason for these 
deals. Also, the focus on aspects where the public opinion is more likely to be positive 
is very common in general and not considered illegal. The previously mentioned allega-
tion in the Polish procurement is insofar questionable as politicians in the United States 
use the same arguments within their own campaigns for arms deals14. 
TOOLS TO FIGHT CORRUPTION 
Based on the comprehensive analysis of articles, a typology of different allegations of 
(conventional) corruption in defense offsets was made. The question that remains to be 
answered is whether or not governmental agencies employ tools that would be useful in 
identifying or fighting these types of corruption. A growing number of academic papers 
have focused on aspects of how to fight corruption, and different strategies have been 
widely discussed in academia, however the majority of this topic occurs in the policy 
papers of international organizations such as the World Bank or the OECD, indicating 
that more comprehensive non-partisan studies must be conducted. 
The overview of cases of corruption in Table 1 shows that two possible scenarios in 
particular seem to happen when a governmental agency is involved. Either, a civil serv-
ant is privately linked to a company and is therefore favoring it over other competitors, 
or, the civil servant gets a bribe from a company and is misusing his power usually by 
misinterpreting or manipulating performance data. These findings are concordant with 
two of Robert Klitgaard’s drivers of corruption (1991): the possibility to work within a 
network (private linkage) and the absence of accountability (misusage of performance 
data). 
Most of the cases of corruption in offsets exhibit the problem of lack of transparency. 
Klitgaard’s discretionary power is insofar a real problem for corruption in arms trade as 
it leads to a complexity that does not allow for explicit verdicts. Therefore the question 
of transparency has to be further discussed as well. 
Networks and Due Diligence 
As the analysis of cases shows, the usage of arms trade offsets to bribe public officials 
has been one - if not the - major allegation in recent years. While there are several 
newspaper articles that do not explain the process of bribery, and overall prompt more 
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befuddlement than deep insight, they do identify some very specific problems. This is 
especially the case when a company, personally associated with public officials, is a 
beneficiary in the second phase of the offset process. This has for example been the case 
in South Africa, where politicians have not just been shareholders of offset beneficiaries 
(February & Calland 2011), but where public officials have taken over a leading posi-
tion in a defense company right after their term in office and during the fulfillment 
phase of the offset obligations (Mitchell 2008). In a very recent report, Transparency 
International, together with one of the biggest arms trade offsets industry associations, 
explicitly tackled the importance of due diligence (Fluker et al. 2012). Based on a sur-
vey of 27 defense suppliers, the report gives a short overview of due diligence practices 
of companies that have offset obligations. While most of the mentioned aspects, such as 
the use of questionnaires for prospective partners or the role of due diligence for offset 
brokers, target the role of companies, the interviews with suppliers showed the need for 
a stronger use of due diligence instruments on the side of the government. The report 
does not define the term due diligence as such, but it especially mentions aspects of cor-
ruption risk awareness within companies. Transparency International’s first report on 
corruption in offsets gives a recommendation specifically for governments, stating that 
they “should require due diligence to be carried out to ensure that no member of the 
government or official will benefit improperly from any offset contract, and to ensure 
that all potential conflicts of interest by officials, military officers and Parliamentarians 
are disclosed” (Magahy et al. 2010, 4). The problem seems to be the reactionary ap-
proach by governments when it comes to the use of such practices within a procurement 
rather than during the hiring process of public servants. First, even though the linkage of 
public officials to specific defense companies that could become offset beneficiaries 
may be widely known within the government, it is not proactively examined or required 
pre-employment information. Second, while a growing number of companies exist that 
do conduct very strict due diligence processes, this is not the case for all companies. As 
a due diligence process is not a required part of most offset proposals, companies which 
voluntarily or by legal restrictions (such as U.S. companies under the Foreign Corrupt 
Practices Act) invest additional resources for these aspects are not rewarded for their 
anti-corruption efforts. Also the very small number of academic literature on due dili-
gence in public management focuses only on the audit portion and is does not discuss 
earlier aspects of due diligence within procurement processes overall15. 
Absence of Accountability and Performance Management 
One of the main allegations of corruption in South Africa, as well as other countries, has 
been the promise of additional jobs for the domestic industry. For example, in the South 
African case the foreign supplier offered offset obligations worth 104 billion Rand (ap-
proximately 17 billion in 1999 USD), which equates to a sum three times as high as the 
procurement contract volume. It was suggested that this sum would create approximate-
ly 65,000 jobs. While this number implies an extreme example of overestimation, this is 
hardly the case when realizing that each of these jobs was projected to cost more than 
20 times as much as an average job in South Africa’s defense industry at that time 
(Dunne & Lamb 2004, 288). Due to a lack of data, it is not possible to calculate the ex-
act number of jobs created with the industrial participation program in South Africa, but 
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the number is most likely not even a third as high as estimated. Several articles have 
claimed that the proposed number of jobs has been a “sweetener” (Unnithan 2005) for 
the procurement act and a “key motivation” (February & Calland 2011) for the entire 
deal. Unfortunately, this analysis is based solely on newspaper articles, and it is not evi-
dent if the proposed number of created jobs was part of the South African contract. For 
a country with an unemployment rate of approximately 30 percent at that time (Dunne 
& Lamb 2004, 288) such an offer was certainly more than welcome, but usually an off-
set contract only contains a defined financial volume. Moreover, it is possible that this 
number was defined and used by the government to promote the arms procurement by 
explaining not only the strategic military reasons, but also a positive economic side ef-
fect. In reality, the supplier was not able to fulfill the public’s expectations. 
Another allegation in South Africa was the usage of multipliers from an original in-
vestment to accrue the offset credits (Ensor 2012). Unfortunately, this case is also not 
defined any further in the articles, but the potential allegation is/was that the company 
did not need to invest the complete offset obligation into the country. While to the pub-
lic this seems to be a clear manipulation, it is a common practice in most offset transac-
tions. A majority of countries use multipliers up to the factor ten (Friedli et al. 2009). 
This means that an investment of one million is counted as offset deals worth ten mil-
lion. The reason for this is that offsets happen most often with companies that lack the 
specific knowledge of how to produce a commissioned part. Multipliers are then used to 
award the technology transfer or the production support of the domestic company by the 
foreign supplier. 
Both given examples, employment creation and multipliers, contain estimates that can 
be used, in the worst case, to misleadingly overestimate the value of offset deals and, in 
the best case, to further complicate the process and decrease transparency. While it 
could be said that some allegations were nothing more than misunderstandings by the 
media, they also show that the usage of indicators is always dangerous. In both cases, 
the allegations led to further (parliamentarian) investigations with, unfortunately, unre-
ported conclusions. 
A recent study of a specific offset example in Switzerland (Platzgummer & Gonzales 
Lozano 2013) suggests that companies tend to overestimate their offset obligations es-
pecially after a phase of underestimated obligations claiming. The reason for this is like-
ly due to the company realizing that the country’s generally weak defense industrial 
base can only handle a specific amount of offsets at the same time,16 and that the ful-
fillment is to be at risk overall. The foreign company is often put under pressure by se-
vere penalties of up to ten percent of the whole offset obligation (Friedli et al. 2009) 
which increases the risk of corruption. Even with very basic performance evaluation 
tools that only provide an analysis of the claimed financial volumes, phases of achieve-
ments below the average could be detected very easily. The governmental agency 
should not only have an overview of the already achieved volume but should also be 
willing to warn the foreign company in such cases. This could prevent cases of corrup-
tion. 
These cases show that even a very simple performance management and audit system, 
containing only input and output measures, would allow an agency to detect the majori-
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ty of corruption scenarios. So there is not really a need to develop new frameworks or 
performance management systems. Instead, efforts are best spent to ensure that a basic 
performance management system is used and that the results are audited internally. One 
possible problem with the use of performance management tools could be the personnel 
structure of the offset agencies. While contracting requires a high knowledge of legal 
aspects, performance management would require managerial know-how. Yet, it is more 
likely that within budgetary restrictions in governments, contracting – as the ultimate 
base of every offset deal – seems to be more important. So hiring lawyers is favored 
over hiring managers. 
A more fundamental aspect of performance management that should be discussed fur-
ther is the prioritization of politically adequate objectives. While the use of additional 
employment numbers as a major benefit seems understandable, especially from a politi-
cian’s point of view, it can be seen as unconventional corruption, as mentioned previ-
ously. Additionally, these objectives are very hard to measure correctly and are – as 
shown in the case of South Africa – ignored by the agency responsible for the perfor-
mance management. This is especially the case when the agency is already understaffed. 
Transparency and Media 
The biggest problem with offsets seems to be the fact that they lack transparency and 
increase the level of complexity. More than once, unspecified allegations were made 
that may or may not be seen as cases of corruption. An example of such a case is an 
allegation in Portugal stating that offsets were claimed for already existing investments 
worth 34 million Euros (February & Calland 2011). While this seems to be a perfectly 
clear case of corruption on the surface, it does not necessarily constitute one. Most 
countries offer the possibility of ’banking’ offset credits. This means that a company is 
allowed to claim a specific amount of deals that have been contracted with offset bene-
ficiaries before the offset agreement is signed. The reason for this is that government 
procurements can be postponed due to tax cuts or political changes. Also, due to tight 
production schedules and a high probability that national companies need some time to 
build up the specific necessary knowledge, governments tend to award first offset con-
tracts to national companies as soon as the competition ends, but before the offset 
agreement is discussed and signed. For example, Switzerland is allowing 20 percent of 
banking credits in the current jet fighter procurement due to a political adjournment of 
the procurement process (Maurer erwägt Verzicht 2012). Again, this is a possible ex-
cuse for the allegation but it does not have to be the ultimate reason. Chances are that 
the acceptance of this offset claim by the governmental agency in Portugal can still be a 
case of corruption. 
While these cases lead to a lot of discussions, the solution to increase transparency is 
relatively easy. In 2008 the European Defence Agency launched the Code of Conduct 
on Offsets (EDA 2011). While the document does not include important political as-
pects on offsets, it has at least increased transparency. For example, all 25 participating 
member states have to publish their offset policies on the EDA webpage. With this, fu-
ture cases, such as the aforementioned Portugal banking case, could be clarified quickly. 
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A second allegation that is frequently made in the media is that offsets are “not bribes, 
but pretty damn close” as U.S. Senator Russ Feingold mentioned in a speech asking the 
U.S. Justice Department to investigate on McDonnell Douglas Corp. offset practices 
(Sennott 1996). Even though offsets are used as marketing tools within procurement 
competitions, most countries demand them very actively. One of the major accom-
plishments of EDA’s code of conduct was the confinement of offset obligations to no 
more than 100 percent. Prior to this code, several countries in the European Union were 
demanding up to 200 percent offset obligations in defense procurements. These vol-
umes were so high that some of the companies could hardly implement them in the few 
defined years of the offset agreement. An additional problem here is the double standard 
provided to foreign suppliers, especially from the United States. While actively asking 
for political support to ban arms trade offsets at home, they have to promote the ad-
vantages of their own offset packages within their proposals abroad. In a globalized 
world, this leads to a situation where the company is sometimes confronted with allega-
tions of bribery overseas, allegations that they were themselves using to ban offsets at 
home. 
Also, the lack of knowledge regarding offsets and the dishevelment of the allegations 
imply the need for an increased transparency. In several cases, the terms offsets and bar-
ter17, or direct or indirect offsets (Pubby 2012) were confused or ambiguous definitions 
were used. One allegation went so far as claiming that in “Bulgaria, one of the EU's 
most corrupt countries, the government set up a special offset office in the Ministry of 
Economy” (EU code 2009), suggesting that this is in and of itself a case of corruption. 
Also the report by Transparency International includes several aspects where a differen-
tiation between corruption in the ‘normal’ procurement and corruption in offsets is not 
possible18, which decreases instead of increases transparency within the report. 
Another main factor of confusion is the United States government. From the point of 
view of the biggest weapons exporting country, it is comprehensible that offsets are 
everything but favored as they force U.S. companies to alter already existing supply 
chains and invest in less competitive foreign countries. It seems that members of the 
U.S. government use the terms “offset” and “corruption” in the same sentence as a mat-
ter of principle, for example: “Offsets are nothing more than economic bribe” (Hunter 
2004), they seem to be “a way to bribe other countries to do something” (Tolchin 1987) 
or they “foster corruption” (Intelligence Online 2008). These arguments would be taken 
more seriously without a Buy American Act, which include the same goals and princi-
ples as offsets. 
What this part of the analysis shows is that governments should increase transparency 
within offsets. This could be accomplished through explicitly dedicated information 
portals, such as that of the European Defence Agency, which offers at least transparent 
policies and some basic information. It could also be provided through specialized edu-
cation in the form of workshops for journalists or special interest groups who focus on 
defense and security topics. Both options would lead to increased transparency even 
within tight budgetary restrictions of such governmental agencies. 
A more general question that should be asked is whether there is really such a “big lack 
of transparency in offsets” (Pressly 2011). The problem with this allegation is that there 
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are very different notions of transparency. Regarding the fact that offsets are part of a 
governmental procurement that involves defense goods, offsets are not more or less 
transparent than the rest of the procurement. Taking into consideration that private 
companies are not usually asked to disclose their complete supply chain to everyone 
(including their competitors), the lack of transparency seems to be relatively small. Also 
from the WTO’s point of view, a view that clearly supports free trade and competition 
in a market, transparency is not really missing. According to article XVII of GATT, 
both contracting partners can request information about the specific operations that can 
impact procurement19. 
CONCLUSIONS 
This paper had the intention to give an overview of known types of corruption in offsets 
and analyze whether tools exist to identify or even fight some of the previously defined 
types. 
What can be seen so far is that a relatively manageable number of different (known) 
types of corruption in arms trade offsets exist. Furthermore, a narrow focus on the first 
part of the offset process from the earliest request for proposal to the date of the contract 
agreement cannot highlight all cases of corruption and should therefore be reconsidered. 
So far, the discussion of corruption in offsets has generally focused on the problems 
concerning the transparency and complexity of arms trade offsets. Still, by using al-
ready existing management tools, a better part of potential cases of corruption can at 
least be observed. The main problem is that more or less all of these specific govern-
mental agencies do not even use basic performance management and are highly influ-
enced by other stakeholders, especially political actors, to use immeasurable indicators 
such as additional employment factors. Additionally, offsets agencies need to deal with 
a very negative prejudice. It is important that government officials responsible for off-
sets know that there is a danger of corruption, and it is even better when they are able to 
flag potential risks within the process, but a closer cooperation with journalists or spe-
cial interest groups such as Transparency International could also help defuse the nega-
tive connotation offsets have to face. Governments could increase transparency and also 
encourage the use of performance management tools for offsets without the implemen-
tation of new tools and with relatively low costs. The introduction of due diligence, an-
other relatively low cost anti-corruption tool could – in combination with performance 
management – also ameliorate the situation for governments as well as for companies. 
As the main intention of the paper was to give an overview of the usage of anti-
corruption tools, some other aspects were only discussed superficially. With the intro-
duction of stricter rules and regulations of offsets within the European Union, the dis-
cussion of conventional and unconventional corruption could be of further interest. It 
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seems that the containment of offsets with the civilian industry is an attempt to decrease 
forms of unconventional corruption. 
Also, the literature review for this paper showed that there is a lack of comparative stud-
ies within the area of performance management. While a number of single case studies 
on the implementation of performance management instruments exist, hardly any re-
search has focused on case-comparison. Additionally, public management is focusing – 
at least in this area – on successful cases, and is ignoring closer looks at the failures of 
performance management. 
NOTES 
 
1 A good definition can be found in Martin (1996b). 
2  See Hartley (2008) for a discussion of technological benefits from offsets in the case 
of Eurofighter Typhoon. 
3  Specific discussions have only been held on the case of South Africa (see for exam-
ple Dunne & Lamb 2004) and (partially) on Saudi Arabia (Marshall 2012). 
4  An advanced Boolean search was conducted with the following keywords and Bool-
ean connectors: (offset* OR countertrade OR barter OR “industrial participation”) 
AND (defen*e OR military) AND (corrupt* OR bribe) 
5  Australia AU, Czech Republic CZ, Greece GR, India IN, Indonesia ID, Poland PL, 
Portugal PT, Saudi Arabia SA, South Africa ZA, South Korea KR, Thailand TH, 
United States of America US. 
6  For example: Kilaz & Hayri (2011), Magahy et al. (2010), or Dunne & Lamb (2004) 
7  South Africa bought 70 JAS Gripen from BAE/Saab and got offered 110 billion 
Rand, an equivalent of roughly 16 billion USD, in offsets that were said to lead to 
65’000 new jobs. 
8  This was especially the case for articles on political discussions in the United States. 
9  The term “threshold” should not be confused in this context with “threshold effects 
of corruption” (e.g. Bose et al. 2008) which is a more common use in academic dis-
cussions. 
10  See Hsieh & Shannon (2005) for a good introduction to this method. 
11  WTO/ GPA Article XVI-1: Entities shall not, in the qualification and selection of 
suppliers, products, or services, or in the evaluation of tenders and award of con-
tracts, impose, seek, or consider offsets. 
12  The European Commission has since then published the new Directive (2009/81/EC) 
for defence and security procurement which excludes non-defense related offsets in 
Europe and in contrary to so far existing non-binding agreements such as EDA’s 
Code of Conduct on Offsets, “the question of whether or not the provisions contained 
in Article 346 TFEU are fulfilled may be decided in court” (Weiner 2012, p. 17). 
13  For further discussion see the very interesting article by M. Patrick Yingling (2013) 
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14  See for example the U.S. KC-X program in which Boeing argued that the decision 
for their aircraft would lead to the creation of 50’000 new jobs (Martinez 2011). 
15  See for example: Glynn & Murphy (1996, 133). 
16  For example with on average 300 million Swiss Francs offset obligations are respon-
sible for more than ten percent of the annual volume of the entire defense industrial 
base in Switzerland (Eisenecker et al. 2012). Regarding the fact that most offset sup-
pliers are not able to work with the whole industrial base from air system to land- or 
even sea system producer, suppliers should try to achieve a relatively balanced allo-
cation of annual obligations. 
17  See for example: Pressly (2011), AFP 1999 or Copley 1985. 
18  See for example the case of Taiwan in Magahy et al. (2010). 
19  For a further discussion see the very interesting article from Robert Howse (2010). 
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